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Immigration continues to be an issue engendering heated political debate.  In 
signing P.L. 109-367, the Secure Fence Act of 2006, the President remarked that “It is an 
important step toward immigration reform.  …  We have more to do.”  (White House, 
2006)  Two earlier proposals in the 109
th Congress – one introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the other in the U.S. Senate – provoked much debate across 
America, and serve to frame U.S. immigration issues.  The 109
th Congress failed to reach 
a compromise between these two sets of views on immigration. 
Legislative proposal H.R. 4437 (the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal 
Immigration Control Act of 2005) was passed by the House of Representatives in 
December 2005.  It is arguably one of the more restrictive proposals introduced for 
consideration in Congress in that it contains no provisions for legalization of 
unauthorized workers or for a guest worker program.  It is pro-enforcement, advocating 
criminal penalties for unauthorized immigrants and hefty fines for the U.S. employers 
who hire them.  Further, it makes no modifications to existing laws on legal immigration, 
and is quite strict on I-9 document reform and worksite/interior/border enforcement.  In 
contrast, S. 2611 (the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006) passed by the 
U.S. Senate in May 2006 proposes earned legalization for unauthorized immigrants and 
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modifications to existing laws on legal immigration. It is not as severe as H.R. 4437 but it 
favors I-9 document reform and stricter enforcement (for example, tougher penalties for 
U.S. employers who hire unauthorized immigrants).   S.2611 also contains specific 
provisions for agriculture under AgJOBS (Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits and 
Security Act of 2005 (S. 359/H.R. 884; S.2611 Subtitle B).  AgJOBS is intended to 
streamline the H-2A program to improve wages, working conditions and minimum 
benefits (housing and transportation) for farm workers and to establish a pilot program 
for earned legalization of unauthorized workers who meet certain requirements.   
Given that the majority of the crop farm workforce is foreign-born (78%) and 
more than 50% is unauthorized for U.S. employment (NAWS, 2004), the U.S. farm labor 
market and the specialty crop sector may be directly affected by immigration reform, 
specifically labor availability and wages.  Based on the assumption that farm workers 
self-select into specific legal status groups, previous work on this issue examined the 
impact of legal status on the farm wage and the types of jobs (skilled or unskilled) for 
which workers are hired.  First, Taylor (1992) explained wages separately for primary 
(skilled) and secondary (unskilled) jobs in agriculture, arguing that there was self-
selectivity into the two types of work.  Legal status of the worker entered the earnings 
equations as an exogenous influence, argued to affect earnings differently for the two job 
types.  Isé and Perloff (1995) explained farm wages based on a model with self-
selectivity into four legal status categories and specified separate earnings equations for 
each status.  Job type (as distinguished by skill level) was not considered in their analysis.  
Iwai et al. (2006) also examined farm workers’ self-selectivity into different legal 
statuses.  Similar to Isé and Perloff (1995), they simulated how the wages of unauthorized workers would change with adjustment to legal status, but did not consider self-selection 
into skilled or unskilled employment.       
This study goes a step further to examine farm workers’ joint self-selection into 
U.S. employment as authorized or unauthorized and for skilled or unskilled jobs.  
Focusing on job type as a potential source of selection bias in conjunction with legal 
status is motivated in part by an interesting conclusion by Taylor (1992) that there may 
be wage differentials for workers of different legal status in the same jobs, such that the 
expected earnings for unauthorized workers in skilled positions could be less than those 
for their authorized cohorts.  The major distinction from previous work is that these two 
employment status indicators are modeled jointly to reflect the potential joint choices by 
workers.  We use data for 1989-2004 from the National Agricultural Workers Survey 
(NAWS) and restrict our sample to the foreign-born population since U.S. citizens do not 
select into legal status for US employment. 
Research Methodology  
The double selection model proposed by Tunali (1986) is used to model the two 
potential sources of selectivity.  A bivariate probit model is used to explain the joint 
decisions/selections on employment status in the first stage.  We constructed selectivity 
parameters from the estimated coefficients and included them as explanatory variables in 
wage regressions in the second stage.  We assume that the i
th individual’s (unobserved) 
decisions on legal status and job type are specified as shown:   
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foreign-born farm workers who are unauthorized & unskilled, and G2, G3 and G4 are 
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authorized & skilled, respectively
2.  If the four subgroups are distinct and completely 
classified, the probability Sj that an individual is assigned to the j
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2 Per the NAWS dataset, pre-harvest, harvest and post-harvest jobs are classified as unskilled positions, 
whereas semi-skilled and supervisory jobs are classified as skilled.         
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In equations 5 through 8,  1 i 1 1 ' x C β =  and 2 i 2 2 ' x C β = ,  2 Φ is the standard bivariate 
normal distribution function and ρ is the correlation coefficient between u1 and u2.  For 
each subgroup with complete observations, ( )( θ σ β θ , x | u E x , x | W E i 3 i 3 3 i
'
i 3 i 3 i 3 + = )  where 
θ denotes the joint outcome of the double selection process.  Selectivity bias arises 
if () 0 , x | u E 31 i 3 ≠ = θ  (Tunali, 1986; Vella, 1998).  The inverse Mills ratios (selectivity 
variables) corresponding to each subgroup are calculated as shown below.  Symbols 
() . φ and  () . Φ  represent the standard univariate normal density and distribution functions, 
respectively
3. 
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The selectivity variables are used as covariates in the log wage equations for each 
subgroup of the foreign-born farm workers, for example, for subgroup G1 we have   
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Results & Discussion 
   Table 1 defines the explanatory variables that were used in the bivariate probit 
and wage equation models.  Tables 2(a) and 2(b) report the summary statistics for each 
foreign-born worker subgroup (authorized & skilled, authorized & unskilled, 
unauthorized & skilled, unauthorized & unskilled) for the U.S. and South
4, respectively.  
Unauthorized & unskilled workers comprise 44%, authorized & unskilled workers 
comprise 32%, authorized & skilled workers comprise 13%, and unauthorized & skilled 
workers comprise 11% of our U.S. sample (n=29364).
5   In our sample of the South 
                                                 
4 The South is defined as Florida, Delta-Southeast (AR, LA, MS, AL, GA, SC) and Appalachia (NC, VA, 
KY, TN, WV).   
  6
5 Throughout the paper, both summary statistics and parameter estimates are based on unweighted sample 
data.  In the absence of a compelling argument to weight the data for parameter estimation (Deaton 1997), 
the parameter estimates reported later in the paper use unweighted data.  Correspondingly, unweighted 
summary statistics are presented to characterize the sample data used for model estimation.  Consequently, 
other reports (Carroll et al. 2005; Walters et al. 2006) focusing solely on representative summaries of the 
data which properly incorporate the weights in generating the summary statistics may differ from summary   7
                                                                                                                                                
(n=6238), the unauthorized & unskilled subgroup comprises the majority (64%) followed 
by the authorized & unskilled (24%) subgroup.  The unauthorized & skilled and 
authorized & skilled subgroups each account for less than 10% of the entire sample, at 
8% and 4%, respectively.   
The summary statistics for the subgroups reveal that foreign-born workers who 
select into farm employment at the national level (US) and in the South are more likely to 
be male and Mexican.  They speak little or no English and have some foreign farm work 
experience.  In both samples, workers in the unauthorized & unskilled and unauthorized 
& skilled subgroups are generally younger than their counterparts in the other subgroups: 
for example, workers’ mean age on average in either of these subgroups is 28 years (U.S. 
sample) and 27 years (South).  Workers represented in the authorized & skilled and 
authorized & unskilled subgroups tend to be in their mid- to late 30s.   
Approximately 15-20% of the workers in the US and the South reported receiving 
free housing from their employer.  The exception was for unauthorized workers in the 
South where 28% of the unskilled workers and 54% of the skilled workers reported free 
housing from their employer.  The proportions of workers reporting having attended adult 
education classes since arriving in the US were understandably higher in both the US and 
the South for authorized workers than for unauthorized workers.   Among authorized 
workers, 28-34% reported adult education in the US while only 10-14% of unauthorized 
workers reported the same.  Although the percentages do not differ greatly between the 
US and the South, the percentages for adult education were slightly higher for authorized 
workers in the South relative to the US, and slightly lower for unauthorized workers in 
the South relative to the US.   
 
characteristics reported here.  The weighted data are more appropriate as a representative summary of the 
data.   8
Most of the workers are employed with growers.  Not surprisingly, authorized 
workers tended to have been employed longer with their current employer; in the U.S., 
they had been employed for over five years whereas they had been employed for only 
two years on average if they were unauthorized.  Similarly, workers in the South had 
been with their current employer for four years on average, whereas unauthorized 
workers had been employed for two years on average.  Regardless of skill level, workers 
who are authorized report longer work periods on average, and have more experience in 
U.S. farm work than their unauthorized cohorts.   Although an analysis of duration of 
farm work in the US is beyond the scope of this paper, the substantial differences 
between authorized and unauthorized workers in years of US farm work are undoubtedly 
dependent on variations between the two groups in the number of years since arriving in 
the US.  By contrast, farm work completed in the last year is quite similar for both 
groups, varying only between 33 and 39 weeks, but again with slightly higher averages 
for authorized workers.   
Bivariate Probit Model Selections 
Foreign-born workers’ choices on employment as authorized or unauthorized 
workers and for skilled or unskilled jobs were estimated with bivariate probit models of 
the U.S. and South.  Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and asymptotic standard 
errors.  The rho (ρ) coefficients are positive and statistically significant at 10% (level of 
significance) in both models.  These results suggest that in the farm labor markets of the 
U.S. and the South, workers’ choices on employment as authorized or unauthorized 
workers and in skilled or unskilled jobs are interrelated.  Thus, foreign-born farm workers 
who are likely to self-select into U.S. employment as unauthorized workers are also 
likely to be employed in unskilled jobs.    9
   The coefficients of the two equations of the U.S. model are statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level or better and have the expected signs.  All else 
being the same, the characteristics that increase the probability that a foreign-born farm 
worker is unauthorized for U.S. employment are: (being) male, single, Mexican, having 
few years of formal education, US farm experience and limited English speaking ability.  
The probability that a worker is unauthorized for U.S. employment increases if he is hired 
in Florida as opposed to California.  However, if he was interviewed before 1993 and has 
attended adult education courses since arriving in the U.S., there is a higher probability 
that he is authorized for U.S. employment, holding all other factors constant.  The 
probability of selection into skilled employment is increased if workers can speak English 
well, if they are educated, and have U.S. and foreign farm work experience.   All else 
being the same, there is also an increased probability of selection into skilled employment 
if the worker is employed on a seasonal basis and has worked for several years with his 
current employer.  On the other hand, the probability decreases if the farm worker is 
employed with a grower, paid a piece rate, and employed in specialty crop agriculture.   
With the exception of the variables reflecting Mexican ethnicity, foreign farm 
work experience, years with current employer and age, the coefficients of the bivariate 
probit model for the South are statistically significant at the 10% level.  The 
characteristics that increase the probability of being authorized and skilled are similar to 
those discussed previously for the U.S. model, the only notable (and statistically 
significant) exceptions being the coefficients for the grower and education variables in 
the skilled equation.  Holding all other factors constant, the probability that a worker 
selects into skilled employment in the South increases if he is employed with a grower – 
this is directly opposite to what was determined for the U.S. model.  The negatively   10
significant coefficient for education is interesting, more so because it suggests that the 
probability of farm workers selecting into skilled employment in the South decreases if 
they are educated.  This is in contrast to the finding on education in the skill equation of 
the U.S. model.     
Table 4 reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a 
worker’s selection into each of the four subgroups identified in the U.S. and South 
samples.  Holding all other characteristics constant, foreign-born workers who are 
interviewed before 1993 are 9% and 3% more likely to be authorized & skilled (US and 
South, respectively) than if they were interviewed after 1993.  In contrast, workers are 
9% and 3% less likely to self-select into the unauthorized & skilled subgroup if they were 
interviewed before 1993.
6  The marginal effects are similar for the US and South for the 
authorized & unskilled (unauthorized & unskilled) subgroups, in that workers are about 
30% more (less) likely to self-select into these employment statuses if they were 
interviewed before 1993.  These effects are expected since roughly 1.3 million farm 
workers gained legal status under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA); 
this particular variable is therefore capturing this effect.  Comparison with the after 2001 
dummy variable shows the opposite marginal effects, in that foreign-born farm workers 
are more likely to select into the unauthorized subgroups (regardless of the job/skill level) 
than into the authorized subgroups.   
Many of the farm workers in specialty crop agriculture are unskilled.  This effect 
comes through in the specialty crop dummy variable in our models of the US (South) in 
that foreign-born workers are 5% (4%) more likely to be authorized & unskilled and 6% 
(14%) more likely to be unauthorized & unskilled if they are employed in specialty crop 
                                                 
6 Note that for any variable included in one equation but not the other, the marginal effects are the mirror 
image for the opposite group.   11
agriculture.   We observe the opposite marginal effects if the workers are skilled 
(regardless of legal status).  The marginal effects induced by the location variables 
(California and Florida) show that workers are more likely to be unauthorized if 
employed in Florida but more likely to be authorized if employed in California.
7   
Wage Equation Models with Selectivity Bias Corrections 
Tables 5 (a) and 5 (b) report the estimated coefficients and asymptotic standard 
errors for the four wage equation models for the US and South, respectively.  Most 
parameter estimates are statistically significant at 10% or better and have the expected 
signs.  The selectivity variable for legal status, λ1, accounts for potential selection bias 
from foreign-born workers’ choices on employment as authorized or unauthorized.  
Selectivity variable   λ2 measures the potential bias arising from workers’ selection into 
skilled or unskilled employment.  The estimated coefficients for both selectivity variables 
are statistically significant across all worker subgroups suggesting the presence of 
selectivity bias in the system.  Thus, if these wage equations were estimated without the 
appropriate corrections, the coefficients would be biased.  
In the four worker subgroups shown for the US in Table 5(a), workers who have 
attended adult education courses, are employed in California, employed with a grower 
and paid by piece rate are more likely to have higher earnings.  Education and English-
speaking ability also have significantly positive effects on farm worker earnings across 
all worker subgroups.  US farm experience has a significant positive nonlinear effect in 
                                                 
7 Although this result may seem counterintuitive, it is a result of excluding native born citizen workers from 
the analysis.  Most authorized workers on the East Coast are native born so that when native born citizen 
workers are excluded, virtually all workers are unauthorized, e.g. there tend to be few green card farm 
workers on the East Coast.  By contrast, on the West Coast most authorized workers were foreign born 
(green card, naturalized citizen, or other form of authorization).  Consequently, the exclusion of native born 
citizens on the East Coast results in a very large change in the proportions of authorized and unauthorized 
workers from what they would be over all types of workers, including native born citizens.   12
all subgroups, and so does age except in the unauthorized & unskilled subgroup.  Free 
housing has a significant and negative effect on farm worker earnings, consistent with the 
theory of compensating differentials.  Regardless of the subgroup that they select into, 
seasonal workers are likely to have lower earnings.   
Overall, our findings are broadly consistent with those of Isé and Perloff (1995) 
and Iwai et al. (2006).  Taylor (1992) found that education and farm work experience 
were significant in explaining skilled employment, but were not so in explaining 
differences in earnings among skilled workers.  The effect of employment in Florida is 
somewhat unclear judging from the results of our model: it is negative and significant in 
the unauthorized & unskilled subgroup (implying that earnings are lower for those 
workers) but positive and significant in the authorized & skilled subgroup (implying that 
this employment status is more advantageous for workers).  Isé and Perloff (1995) and 
Iwai et al. (2006) found that workers employed in Florida had lower earnings on average 
-- Isé and Perloff noted that they were paid significantly less than workers employed in 
California, whereas Iwai et al. were able to confirm this only for unauthorized workers.      
 In the earnings equations for the South, females, workers for whom free housing 
is provided, and those who are hired for seasonal work tend to have lower earnings if 
they belong to any subgroup other than authorized & skilled.  In contrast to the results 
based on the total US data, these variables have no statistically significant effect on 
workers’ earnings in the latter subgroup.  Age has a significant nonlinear effect in the 
authorized (skilled or unskilled) subgroups only.  Conversely, workers who have attended 
adult education courses since arriving in the U.S., who are employed by a grower, paid 
by piece rate, and educated are likely to earn more, as was the case for farm workers 
throughout the US.  In addition, English speaking ability has a statistically significant   13
effect on Southern workers’ earnings only if the workers are authorized for US 
employment, in contrast to all farm workers regardless of authorization status for the total 
US data.  Farm work experience has a statistically significant effect with the typical 
earnings profile for all groups in the South except authorized & skilled workers for which 
log earnings increase with experience at a constant rate rather than a decreasing rate; all 
groups were statistically significant and appropriately shaped for the total US data.  
 The piece rate dummy variable is dominant in both the US and Southern earnings 
equations.  All else being the same, payment by piece rate increases earnings by more 
than 20% in unskilled subgroups regardless of authorization, but to a lesser extent in the 
skilled subgroups (<13%).  The magnitude of influence is less in the Southern earnings 
equations but is comparable across all subgroups, increasing earnings by 18% or more 
regardless of skill level. The grower dummy variable also yields some interesting 
differences between the US and Southern subgroups.  Based on the total US data, our 
results suggest employment with a grower would increase workers’ earnings by 7% or 
more if they are authorized for US employment.  In the South however, the effect on 
earnings is larger for skilled than for unskilled workers – for example, authorized & 
(un)skilled and unauthorized & (un)skilled workers’ earnings increase by 9% (4%) and 
6% (5%), respectively.    
Our results show that employer-provided free housing has a statistically 
significant effect on earnings for most of the US and Southern worker subgroups.  The 
US data show rather modest negative effects varying between 2% and 4% of earnings, 
with unauthorized workers having the larger differential.  The situation is reversed in the 
South: authorized & unskilled workers’ earnings are approximately 7% less in the   14
presence of free housing, but unauthorized workers’ earnings are about 4% less in the 
presence of free housing regardless of skill level.       
Finally, we report the average predicted earnings for each subgroup in the US and 
South in Table 6.  The predicted earnings are highest for workers who self-select into the 
authorized & unskilled subgroups ($8.13 and $7.77, respectively, for the US and the 
South).  In the US market, workers self-selecting into the authorized & skilled subgroup 
have the second highest average earnings ($7.82), followed by those individuals who 
choose to be employed as unauthorized & unskilled workers ($7.20).  In the South, 
individuals who opt for employment as authorized & skilled workers also have higher 
average earnings ($7.24) than those who self-select into the unauthorized & unskilled 
subgroup ($6.97).  Interestingly, the lowest average earnings are for workers who self-
select into skilled employment as unauthorized workers: $6.92 (US); $6.36 (South).  This 
result suggests that self-selection into skilled employment without legal status is 
disadvantageous to the average foreign-born farm worker; unauthorized workers doing 
skilled work are significantly penalized for their legal status.  These findings are 
consistent with those reported by Taylor (1992) who concluded that unauthorized status 
could hamper workers’ chances of skilled employment or at least result in lower wages 
that would in turn discourage them from moving into those jobs.         
Conclusions 
Two employment status indicators, legal status and the job type (distinguished by 
skill), were modeled jointly to reflect the potential joint choices by foreign-born farm 
workers.  This is the major distinction between our study and previous examinations of 
the workers’ self-selectivity into legal status in the farm labor market.  Further, we   15
restricted our sample to the foreign-born population since U.S. citizens do not select into 
legal status for employment in the US.   
We found a statistically significant relationship between foreign-born workers’ 
selection into skilled or unskilled employment as authorized or unauthorized; this implies 
that workers who are likely to select into skilled (unskilled) employment are more likely 
to be authorized (unauthorized).  In our models of the US and South, we determined 
similar sets of characteristics associated with workers who select into the different 
statuses (authorized & skilled, authorized & unskilled, unauthorized & skilled, 
unauthorized & unskilled).  In general, unauthorized and unskilled status is associated 
with workers who have limited English-speaking ability, few years of formal education 
and US farm experience.  We determined that education was less of a factor for skilled 
employment in the South in contrast to the US overall.  Further, Southern farm workers 
have a higher probability of selecting into skilled employment if they are employed with 
growers; this is directly opposite to our results based on the total US data.   
Our earnings results indicate some interesting differences between the US and the 
South.  First, English-speaking ability appears to matter for earnings in the South only if 
the workers are authorized; in contrast, the total US data indicate that it positively 
influences earnings regardless of authorization status.   Second, employment with 
growers in the South tends to increase workers’ earnings more so if they are employed in 
skilled positions; conversely, the US data suggest larger earnings increases if the workers 
are authorized for US employment.  Third, in the South, a housing provision decreases 
the earnings of authorized & unskilled workers more so than unauthorized workers 
(regardless of skill level); in the US, unauthorized workers would experience slightly 
larger earnings decreases than their authorized cohorts.       16
The group of workers in the South of most interest in the context of immigration 
reform is the unskilled group.  A few key findings of most interest in terms of worker 
earnings are the following.  Unauthorized workers earn 22% more when paid by the piece 
rate, while authorized workers earn 30% more with the piece rate.  Being a seasonal 
worker reduces earnings by 2% for unauthorized workers, but 6% for authorized workers.  
And finally, English ability has no significant effect for unauthorized workers, but 
improves earnings for authorized workers by about 4%. 
Finally, our results on earnings differences by legal status and job (skill) type 
concur with those reported by Taylor (1992).  Regardless of whether they are employed 
in the US or South, unauthorized workers holding skilled jobs are penalized for doing so.   17
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Table 1: Explanatory Variables for Bivariate Probit & Wage Models
a 
 





Natural logarithm of the real farm wage in 2004 dollars.  Conversions 
from the nominal wage were made using the consumer price index for all 
urban consumers 
 
Authorized  =1 if farm worker is authorized for U.S. employment (citizen, permanent 
resident, or has other work authorization) 
= 0 if otherwise (i.e. unauthorized) 
 
Skill  =1 if task is semi-skilled or supervisory job 
=0 if otherwise (pre-harvest, harvest, post harvest jobs) 
 
Piece Rate  = 1 if worker is paid by piece rate 
= 0 if otherwise (by the hour, hour/piece combination, or salary) 
 
Seasonal Worker  =1 if worker is employed on a seasonal basis 
= 0 if otherwise (year-round) 
 
Female  =1 if female 
=0 if male 
 
Mexican  = 1 if worker is of Mexican nationality  
=0 if otherwise 
 
Education  Highest grade level of education completed by the farm worker, ranging 
from 0 to 16 
 
Adult Education
b =1 if worker had attended any adult education classes or school in the 
U.S. 
=0 if otherwise 
Before 1993  Dummy variable reflecting the interview years after the 1986 IRCA but 
before 1993 
After 2001  
 




Dummy variable reflecting employment in California at the time of the 
interview 
 
Florida (FL)  
 





=1 if worker (and family, if applicable) receives free housing from current 
employer  
=0 if otherwise 
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Table 1: Explanatory Variables for Bivariate Probit & Wage Models, (continued) 
 
Variable   Definition 
   
English speaking 
ability 
= 1 if ‘none at all’ 
= 2 if ‘a little’ 
= 3 if ‘somewhat’ 
= 4 if ‘well’  
 
Married  = 1 if ‘married/living together’ 
=0 if otherwise 
 
Years with current 
employer 
Number of years of employment worker has completed with current 
employer.  One year is measured as one or more days per year (NAWS) 
 






=1 if worker had been employed in agriculture, either full-time or part-
time, while living in native (foreign) country 
=0 if worker had been employed in non-agricultural sector or had never 




= 1 if employed by a grower 
= 0 if employed by a farm labor contractor 
 
Specialty Crop  = 1 if worker was employed in specialty crop production at the time of the 
interview 
=0 if otherwise 
 
Age  Respondent age in years 
 
Age
2 Age squared 
 
Experience  Years of U.S. farm work 
 
Experience
2 Experience squared 
 
λ1 Selectivity correction term from the legal status (authorized) decision 
equation 
λ2 Selectivity correction term from the job type (skill) decision equation 
 
a Data were sourced from the National Agricultural Workers Survey.  Definitions enclosed in quotation 
marks are as they appear in the NAWS Codebook.   
 
b This would include English/ESL, citizenship, literacy, job training and Adult Basic Education classes, 
GED/high school equivalency classes, college or university classes, and Even Start and Migrant Education 




Authorized & Unskilled 
Subgroup (n=9434)
Unauthorized
 & Skilled Subgroup 
(n=3125) 
Unauthorized
 & Unskilled Subgroup 
(n=12902)









   
Housing  0.15322                0.36024 0.16218 0.36863 0.19264 0.39444 0.21710 0.41229
Adult Education   0.29029                0.45395 0.28344 0.45069 0.14080 0.34787 0.13223 0.33875
Before 1993  0.22700                0.41895 0.29924 0.45795 0.07488 0.26324 0.09247 0.28969
After 2001  0.24648                0.43101 0.26087 0.43913 0.36224 0.48072 0.39304 0.48844
California  0.66308                0.47272 0.45177 0.49769 0.48736 0.49992 0.31662 0.46517
Florida  0.03485                0.18341 0.11925 0.32410 0.03488 0.18351 0.16145 0.36796
Female  0.12042                0.32549 0.22186 0.41552 0.09504 0.29332 0.15439 0.36134
Married  0.80656                0.39505 0.74698 0.43477 0.50912 0.50000 0.49310 0.49997
English  2.00000                0.88614 1.89177 0.89538 1.50912 0.68899 1.48295 0.69390
Mexican  0.90161                0.29787 0.87799 0.32731 0.93248 0.25096 0.89374 0.30819
Education  5.59672                3.29263 5.64755 3.45410 6.13696 3.06551 6.05550 3.17261
Experience  16.26057                8.85396 14.11363 8.97386 5.96288 5.62182 5.01984 5.30795
Experience
2 342.77860                357.31130 279.71610 365.99610 67.15072 160.43600 53.37095 156.38060
Age  39.00692                11.08921 37.77411 11.60935 28.53664 9.51811 28.30422 9.64938
Age
2 1644.47900                930.86990 1561.64600 960.38850 904.90530 683.31520 894.23200 686.38450
Seasonal worker  0.50602                0.50003 0.52258 0.49952 0.52192 0.49960 0.48279 0.49972
Foreign Farmwork 
Experience   0.71253                0.45264 0.60695 0.48845 0.72960 0.44424 0.68803 0.46331
Years with Current 
Employer  6.56444                5.90306 5.39029 5.28969 2.79104 2.58669 2.44389 2.33974
Farmwork weeks  38.64935                11.82657 36.37304 13.27431 34.50295 15.05507 33.20103 16.35835
Piece rate  0.10838                0.31090 0.22006 0.41431 0.13504 0.34182 0.21446 0.41047
Grower  0.81655                0.38708 0.79309 0.40511 0.74208 0.43756 0.76190 0.42594
Specialty crop  0.84653                0.36049 0.92315 0.26637 0.81600 0.38755 0.88947 0.31356
 
  20  21




Authorized & Unskilled 
Subgroup (n=1524)
Unauthorized
 & Skilled Subgroup 
(n=492)
Unauthorized
 & Unskilled Subgroup 
(n=3995)









   
Housing  0.21586                0.41233 0.21785 0.41292 0.54268 0.49868 0.28511 0.45152
Adult Education   0.34361                0.47596 0.29134 0.45453 0.09553 0.29424 0.10738 0.30964
Before 1993  0.40529                0.49203 0.45801 0.49840 0.11382 0.31792 0.14919 0.35632
After 2001  0.21586                0.41233 0.21457 0.41066 0.13821 0.34547 0.32466 0.46830
Female  0.13216                0.33941 0.27034 0.44428 0.10976 0.31290 0.16446 0.37073
Married  0.68722                0.46465 0.66470 0.47225 0.43699 0.49652 0.44856 0.49741
English  2.15859                1.02251 1.89042 0.91054 1.50000 0.66785 1.44631 0.65494
Mexican  0.81938                0.38555 0.77034 0.42075 0.82317 0.38191 0.80075 0.39949
Education  5.62996                3.21289 5.21588 3.48583 5.68089 3.07573 5.61151 3.31153
Experience  12.05286                7.50497 11.37336 8.13843 4.12602 4.79990 4.27384 4.54947
Experience
2 201.34800                231.35190 195.54400 345.47110 40.01626 130.45890 38.95820 144.65990
Age  35.78414                10.83350 35.77887 11.60180 27.13211 8.83872 27.50713 9.16937
Age
2 1397.35200                839.99970 1414.64100 921.37150 814.11590 597.43770 840.69860 629.38020
Seasonal worker  0.41410                0.49365 0.44488 0.49712 0.67276 0.46968 0.50738 0.50001
Foreign Farmwork 
Experience   0.63436                0.48267 0.58136 0.49350 0.70935 0.45452 0.66984 0.47033
Years with Current 
Employer  4.12335                4.21047 4.11221 3.96354 1.93902 1.66072 2.09011 1.86953
Farmwork weeks  40.71743                13.43007 39.97666 13.17330 30.70006 16.70126 34.31050 17.26394
Piece rate  0.10132                0.30242 0.34449 0.47536 0.10976 0.31290 0.31840 0.46591
Grower  0.87225                0.33455 0.76640 0.42326 0.81301 0.39030 0.70113 0.45782
Specialty crop  0.68722                0.46465 0.88320 0.32128 0.29675 0.45729 0.77397 0.41831 












































































































































































































(0.00015)    
 
US sample size = 29364;    Log-likelihood = -26995.78;   Rho (ρ) = 0.034*  
 
South sample size = 6238;    Log-likelihood = -4152.83;  Rho (ρ) = 0.0759*
 
a Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks (**, *) indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% 
levels of significance, respectively.   Table 4: Marginal Effects of Bivariate Probit Estimates of Selection into Legal Status & Job (Skill) Type (US & South) 
 
      Marginal Effect








  US  South  US  South  US  South  US  South 
Adult  Education                  0.01650 0.00774 0.05522 0.07454 -0.01650 -0.00774 -0.05522 -0.07454
Before  1993  0.08918                0.03369 0.30312 0.33733 -0.08918 -0.03369 -0.30312 -0.33733
After  2001                  -0.04226 -0.00710 -0.14031 -0.06679 0.04226 0.00710 0.14031 0.06679
California    0.02839 n/a  0.09483  n/a  -0.02839  n/a  -0.09483  n/a 
Florida    -0.01404 n/a  -0.04665  n/a  0.01404  n/a  0.04665  n/a 
Female                  0.00012 0.00473 0.17351 0.11010 -0.07256 -0.02510 -0.10107 -0.08973
Married                  0.01801 0.00333 0.06000 0.03155 -0.01801 -0.00333 -0.06000 -0.03155
English                  0.03590 0.01344 0.08843 0.07926 -0.01919 0.00783 -0.10514 -0.10053
Mexican                  -0.01223 0.00037 -0.04092 0.00353 0.01223 -0.00037 0.04092 -0.00353
Education                  0.00355 0.00025 0.00828 0.00727 -0.00165 -0.00242 -0.01018 -0.00509
Experience                  0.01853 0.00459 0.05166 0.04020 -0.01312 -0.00313 -0.05707 -0.04166
Experience
2 -0.00025                -0.00006 -0.00082 -0.00057 0.00025 0.00006 0.00082 0.00057
Age    0.00683                0.00162 0.01127 0.00851 -0.00069 0.00141 -0.01742 -0.01155
Age
2 -0.00007                -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00005 -0.00002 -0.00003 0.00016 0.00010
Seasonal  worker                  0.01464 0.00473 -0.01464 -0.00473 0.01923 0.01717 -0.01923 -0.01717
Foreign 
Farmwork 
Experience  0.01463                0.00153 -0.01463 -0.00153 0.01920 0.00555 -0.01920 -0.00555
Years with 
Current 
Employer                  0.00178 -0.00047 -0.00178 0.00047 0.00234 -0.00171 -0.00234 0.00171
Farmwork  Weeks                  0.00031 0.00009 -0.00031 -0.00009 0.00040 0.00034 -0.00040 -0.00034
Piece rate  -0.04617  -0.01754  0.04617  0.01754          -0.06031 -0.06294 0.06031 0.06294
Grower  -0.01192                0.00585 0.01192 -0.00585 -0.01568 0.02111 0.01568 -0.02111
Specialty  Crop                  -0.04697 -0.03842 0.04697 0.03842 -0.06216 -0.14481 0.06216 0.14481Table 5(a): Wage Models for Each Worker Subgroup (US)
a

































































































































































































(0.0367)   25
Table 5(b): Wage Models for Each Worker Subgroup (South) 
 



















































































































































































a Asterisks (**, *) indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.  
Standard errors have not been corrected for the two-step estimation.    26
Table 6: Average Predicted Conditional Wage for Each Legal Status & Job Type 
Subgroup in the US and South
a 
 





    
Authorized & skilled (G11)  7.82 7.24 
Authorized & unskilled (G10)  8.13 7.77 
Unauthorized & skilled G(01)  6.92 6.36 
Unauthorized & unskilled G(00)  7.20 6.97 
 
a Average wages are conditioned on the selectivity variables for legal status and skill 
type. 